Human dignity. Normative core. Static scope. Dynamic scope. Right to development.

Abstract

Context: Although human dignity has become established as the ethical and legal foundation of most contemporary legal systems, particularly in Western democracies, it still lacks an objective definition. Its legal application faces the challenge of translating universal value into practical solutions, given that the concept is constantly shaped by the complexity of social relations and by subjective value judgments. Problem: Given this context, the following question arises: How should the process of (re)defining human dignity be carried out, considering the objectivity that is inseparable from the definition of the criterion of justice – that is, what constitutes a just solution? In other words, how can we objectively answer the question: What does it mean to treat a human person with dignity? Objectives: The objective of this article is to demonstrate the capacity of the right to development – a fundamental, interdimensional human right – to fulfill this function. Method: The data collection method was bibliographic-documentary; the approach to this data was critical-narrative review. Results and Discussion: The normative core of human dignity consists of two dimensions: one static and the other dynamic. The static dimension, based on the inherent humanity of the person and their self-determination, encompasses vital and existential minimums. The dynamic aspect, inherent in the capacities derived from the exercise of self-determination, finds its foundation in the interdimensionality inherent in the right to development. Conclusion: A new conception of the normative core of human dignity is proposed, encompassing both the static and dynamic spheres and linked to the right to development. This new concept will entail the acceptance of duality: the vital minimum and development, as inseparable elements of the definition of human dignity.